Brekend rapport: ISIS werd bewapend door EU en VS – De Nieuwe Realist

joostniemoller.nl · by Joost Niemöller · December 23, 2017

ISIS is nu praktisch verslagen, en de droom van het kalifaat in Syrië en Irak lijkt voorlopig vervlogen. Maar de vraag is natuurlijk: Hoe heeft die gruwelijke organisatie kunnen ontstaan? Ten eerste natuurlijk door de ideologie van de islam. Maar een ideologie alleen is niet genoeg. Er moet ook een organisatie zijn. Financiële stromen. Smokkelkanalen voor aankomende soldaten. Training. Grondstoffen. En bovenal wapens.

Waar kwamen de wapens voor ISIS vandaan? Dat werd overtuigend uitgezocht in een net verschenen rapport van CAR, een Britse organisatie die de internationale wapensporen volgt.

De conclusie van CAR is dat de meeste wapens van ISIS door de VS en Saoedi-Arabië werden verscheept, vooral via Turkije en Jordanië, naar de steeds verschuivende oppositiegroepen in Syrië, waarna ze snel, en soms al in eerste instantie, in handen kwamen van ISIS. Het overgrote deel van deze wapens was van Chinese, Russische, Roemeense en Bulgaarse makelij. Daarbij werden exportwetten van de VS en de EU overtreden.

Unauthorised retransfer—the violation of agreements by which a supplier government prohibits the re-export of materiel by a recipient government without its prior consent—is a significant source of IS weapons and ammunition. The United States and Saudi Arabia supplied most of this materiel without authorisation, apparently to Syrian opposition forces. This diverted materiel, recovered from IS forces, comprises exclusively Warsaw Pactcalibre weapons and ammunition, purchased by the United States and Saudi Arabia from European Union (EU) Member States in Eastern Europe.

Het ging daarbij soms om zware wapens, zoals anti-tankwapens, die nieuw werden gefabriceerd in de EU, werden doorverkocht naar de VS, en zo terecht kwamen in het ondoorzichtige Syrische ‘rebellennetwerk’ Binnen twee maanden belandden deze raketten van de fabriek in de EU bij ISIS:

CAR documentation shows that the most rapid case of diversion following unauthorised retransfer was that of an advanced anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW). The weapon was manufactured in the EU, sold to the United States, supplied to a party in the Syrian conflict, transferred to IS forces in Iraq, and documented by a CAR field investigation team following its recovery from IS forces. The full chain oftransactions occurred within two months of the weapon’s dispatch from the factory.

De bron voor de chemische wapens van ISIS, bleek vooral Turkije te zijn. In een aantal gevallen werden deze chemische wapens welbewust op de Turkse markt geproduceerd voor jihadistische acties in Syrië:

IS forces have relied on a steady stream of commercial products and explosive goods to construct unprecedented numbers of IEDs. Turkish territory is the main—although not exclusive—source of chemical explosive precursors (ammonium nitrate, otassium nitrate, aluminium paste, and sorbitol), detonating cord, detonators, containers used to house IED main charges, and ancillary IED components employed by IS forces. CAR has identified specific parties responsible for purchasing these components on the Turkish market and for supplying a range of opposition forces in northern Syria, including Salafist jihadist factions.

Aan de serienummers van aangetroffen Chinese wapens in de veroverde opslagruimten van ISIS, bleek dat het om complete, gloednieuwe partijen ging.Die werden opgeslagen met de drugs die de ISIS strijders werden toegediend om hun gruwelijke werk te kunnen verrichten:

Between 23 and 28 September 2017, CAR documented 122 Chinese Type 81 7.62 x 39 mm light machine guns and 61 Chinese Type 67-2 7.62 x 54R mm medium machine guns, recovered from an IS cache in the Al Shura district, south of Mosul. Iraqi forces recaptured the area in October 2016. The serial numbers of the weapons are either in sequence (that is, 1, 2, 3), or close in sequence (such as 1, 3, 6), and indicate production in 2007 and 2008. One to three pouches filled with powder were affixed to each weapon. Presumptive analysis revealed that the powder was a performanceenhancing amphetamine. The close serial number sequencing of 122 identical weapons indicates a large diversion from a single intended end user. It is clear that, following acquisition, IS forces had stockpiled the weapons together with individual rations of performance-enhancing drugs for issue to its fighters.

De meeste nieuwe raketten van ISIS, bleken geproduceerd door China en Iran (en Bulgarije), waarmee het Amerikaans/Europese transportspoor werd afgedekt:

China and Iran manufactured most of the post-2010 (produced in 2010 or later) 40 mm rockets that were recovered from IS forces in Iraq. As with the overall sample of 40 mm rockets, the top three manufacturers of post-2010 40 mm rockets are China, Iran, and Bulgaria, which together produced 97 per cent of the rockets.

Een veel kleiner deel was afkomstig van het Irakese leger, en dus van overgelopen, soennitische soldaten, of veroverde Irakese opslagplaatsen:

These two findings indicate that, at the very least, 12 per cent of the weapons recovered from IS forces originate from Iraqi national stockpiles. The group captured a large proportion of this stockpile during major offensives against Iraqi armed forces in the Mosul region in mid-2014. CAR field investigation teams, which were on the ground in both Iraq and Syria at the time, obtained some clues regarding the role this materiel might have played in IS forces’ subsequent military gains.

Vastgesteld kon worden, nogmaals, dat met name Turkije en Jordanië functioneerden als gewillige doorvoerlanden van de Amerikaanse en Saoedische transportlijnen. Vervolgens kwamen de wapens snel, via diverse tussenpartijen bij ISIS. CAR kan niet uitsluiten dat het in een aantal gevallen zelfs direct bij ISIS terecht kwam:

IS forces deploy a range of weaponry that can be traced to transfers destined for opposition forces in the Syrian conflict. While the exact circumstances of direct supply across Syria’s borders are unclear, the Jordanian and Turkish governments have each acted as intermediaries in the provision of weapons purchased by Saudi Arabia and the United States. Background information gathered by CAR indicates that IS forces acquired the materiel through varied means, including battlefield capture and the amalgamation of disparate Syrian opposition groups. CAR cannot rule out direct supply to IS forces from the territories of Jordan and Turkey, especially given the presence of various opposition groups, with shifting allegiances, in cross-border resupply locations.

In verschillende gevallen kon concreet vast gesteld worden dat ISIS wapens vanuit de Bulgaarse fabriek, via de VS bij ISIS terecht kwamen. Dit werd bevestigd door Bulgarije. De VS wilde niet meewerken aan het onderzoek:

In the last phase of the battle for eastern Mosul, in January 2017, Iraqi Special Operations Forces recovered another 9M111MB-1 ATGW missile tube from IS forces, but this one features a different lot number. Bulgaria confirmed the item was sold to a Bulgarian export company, which subsequently exported it to the US Department of the Army on an unspecified date.31 The United States has not yet replied to a CAR trace request for this item.

De VS werkte bij het verhandelen en transporteren van de wapens naar ISIS, met bedrijven op contractbasis:

The United States has relied on brokers to supply weapons and ammunition to partner countries via Eastern Europe for years. Companies such as Kiesler Police Supply, which CAR has linked to recent diversion of materiel, were contracted by the US Department of Defense after 2003 to supply Iraq with weapons and ammunition during the US intervention. Equipment and supplies from that period continue to circulate and some are now deployed by IS forces.

Ook Libië was in die periode een draaipunt om de wapens naar ISIS te krijgen:

Documentation and analysis by CAR indicates that Libyan weapon supply chains have extended as far as Syria, as evidenced by a substantial maritime seizure of weapons consigned to Syrian opposition forces from Libya; consignment information that establishes that materiel recovered from IS forces in Iraq was originally consigned to Libya; and a congruence of weapon and ammunition types documented in Libya and Syria.

Met name in Turkije bleek dat de bestemming van de chemicaliën voor ISIS opzettelijk slecht geregistreerd te zijn, waar dit wel vereist is:

These findings point to the Turkish domestic market as a primary source of chemical precursors used by IS forces in the manufacture of HME and propellant. They also expose weaknesses in supply-side controls, which are designed to monitor the end use of such chemicals, as these products move along the supply chain. A number of local Turkish distributors, for example, claimed in their responses to CAR’s trace requests that their records did not include the requisite information to identify specific customers. These gaps in information make identifying, and hence curbing, terrorist acquisition of precursors extremely difficult.

Het ging in verreweg de meeste gevallen niet om oude wapens, maar om gloednieuwe wapens, die werden gemaakt en geleverd toen al bekend was waartoe ISIS in staat was:

If these acquisitions were restricted to old, ‘legacy’ weapons, which happened to be present in the arsenals of the two governments, there would arguably be few viable avenues available to restrict weapon acquisition by IS forces. Evidence presented in this report, however, confirms that many of the group’s weapons—and notably its ammunition—are newly manufactured, having been delivered to the region since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. These weapons originate in transfers made by external parties, including Saudi Arabia and the United States, to disparate Syrian opposition forces arrayed against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Supplied into Syria through the territories of regional proxies—notably Jordan and Turkey—this materiel was rapidly captured by IS forces, only to be deployed by the group against international coalition forces.

Deze manier van werken van het Westen en van Saoedi-Arabië is niet nieuw. Het gebeurde ook al in Afghanistan, waarbij de jihadi’s werden bewapend tegen de Russen, met als gevolg dat datzelfde Westen werd aangevallen met de door henzelf geleverde wapens:

These dynamics are not new among the adverse effects associated with international intervention in civil wars. Support by Saudi Arabia and the United States to non-state forces in the 1980s Afghan conflict displayed similar patterns: weapons provided to non-state groups arrayed against a common enemy; a concentration of Salafist jihadist groups, which proved the most organised and the most effective at acquiring foreign-supplied weapons; a devolution to neighbouring states of the responsibility for deciding which groups received weapons (in the Afghanistan case, Pakistan, and in the Syria case, Jordan and Turkey); and a blowback effect, whereby weapon supplier states end up being targeted by the forces that they armed indirectly— and having to confront them militarily.

Met de wapenleveranties aan ISIS werd regelgeving van de EU en de VS genegeerd:

Moreover, many of these transfers have violated the terms of sale and export agreed between weapon exporters—primarily EU Member States—and recipients in Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Met dit rapport werd de cynische hypocrisie van de VS en de EU dus concreet blootgelegd.

Nederlandstalige- geselecteerde- maar niet gepubliceerde artikelen:

[rss url=https://www.instapaper.com/folder/3512068/rss/6196606/hBBwhP0ZNQTzoQKPjMpBOlQ75o show_title=true show_links=ture show_summary=true show_author=true show_date=true recent=false]